India is the Great Game’s great spectator

suchithkc

Indian commentary following the killing of Osama bin Laden by a United States commando team on May 1 has come to three conclusions, two of them completely contradictory to each other:
- This is the end of the US-Pakistan relationship. The Americans told the Pakistanis nothing about the bin Laden operation and Washington, DC, loathes and completely distrusts the politicians in Islamabad and the generals in Rawalpindi.
- This is a new beginning in the US-Pakistan relationship. The Americans and the Pakistanis worked in conjunction and (a section of) the generals in Rawalpindi betrayed bin Laden to rid themselves of Al Qaeda and strengthen the bond with Washington, DC. The Pakistanis are now pretending they knew nothing but that is for public consumption.
- The Americans are looking for an excuse to exit Afghanistan. The bin Laden killing is just what they need. President Barack Obama will declare the war on terror over, say Al Qaeda has been decapitated and call the troops home.
Obviously conclusions one and two cannot both be true. Indeed, there is a fair case that all three assumptions are flawed. For one, these are too pat and too black-and-white, ignoring the nuances and grey areas that make up international politics. They are also extremely simplistic.
Take assumption two as an example. There have been reports — from sources as diverse as US-based correspondents of Indian newspapers and government officials in China — that Pakistan helped the US finish bin Laden. As such it has collected IOUs it will redeem in times to come. In this framework, whatever the public may believe, the upper echelons of the Obama administration and the American security establishment know the truth.
This is an outlandish theory but let us take it at face value. The Pakistan government has not only cooperated in the killing of bin Laden, it has refused to take credit because it is worried about popular reaction in its own country. However, it has allowed itself to be demonised in another country — the US — and is willing to risk democratic pressure, from voters and local communities upwards, on senators, on officials in Washington, DC, and on the State Department and White House that would want strong action against Pakistan, including the withholding of aid.
Does this make sense?
Where then is the truth? Frankly nobody knows and nobody will know but it is a fair bet that some Pakistanis may have helped the Americans get bin Laden but not quite the government of Pakistan. Also, it is impossible that the US shared real-time operational details — 'We will send SEALs in helicopters on date X to kill bin Laden in place Y' — with anybody, whether Pakistan-based spies or the government, much less the army.
Nevertheless, the bin Laden killing will have implications and it is not as if life will continue as usual. So what could the scenario pan out like?
First, the US is enjoying Pakistan's discomfiture. It realises public opinion and sheer embarrassment will force the government in Islamabad to offer a few sacrifices. It will need to sack some people, including those who directly sheltered — or knew those who directly sheltered — bin Laden. There could be other sackings as well, of those perceived as too close to and too willing to listen to the Americans. Certainly, the US would have a wish-list of those it wants sacked. It could get some scalps in the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and the military.
Second, the Great Game is not a one-way street. A mood has been building in wings of the ISI and Pakistani army for the past few weeks that calls for the removal of both President Asif Zardari and Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani or at least one of them. These quarters see the civilian government as too timid and too willing to give in to American demands. The inability to prevent or protest strongly enough against the bin Laden operation will add to the catalogue of complaints.
In South Block, there is a growing belief that America-sceptic segments of the ISI and the army are raising the profile of Imran Khan as a civilian alternative. He will be projected as a Punjabi mainstream politician, sensitive to nativist/Islamist concerns — without being identified with violent extremism — and capable of wearing nationalist or Muslim-nationalist shoes to stand up to the Americans.
This was the political platform once occupied by Nawaz Sharif. It is now up for grabs. The bin Laden episode may accelerate the search for an option, and Pakistan's greatest cricket captain may just get lucky.
Third, contrary to instant analyses, there is actually less pressure on Obama to withdraw from Afghanistan than there was two years ago, when he became president. The bin Laden killing has revived memories of 9/11 in the US. It has made the quintessential Middle American conscious once more of the danger to the US from a wild, under-policed Afghanistan. Obama could use this sentiment to argue for a sustained engagement in Afghanistan rather than a withdrawal.
Will he? Chances are he will. Obama's counter-terrorism line has evolved significantly since he became president. Whether on drone attacks inside Pakistan, targeted assassinations (such as that of bin Laden), the Guantanamo Bay prison facility or keeping the troops in Afghanistan and even Iraq, Obama's differences with the policy advocated by President George W. Bush have narrowed to a point where they appear indistinguishable.
As he approaches his re-election, Obama has his national security credentials sewn up. He has been cold-blooded enough to order the gunning down of bin Laden. To protect American lives, he is willing to fight battles in not just Afghanistan but also Pakistan. Unless he now wants to suddenly please the extreme left of the Democratic Party — and jeopardise his standing among the middle and centre-right of American politics — there is no reason for him to dramatically alter the course.
Obama's second-term hopes are 18 months away. Till then, he will strive for a recovery on the job front. No doubt he will use protectionism and muscle-flexing to achieve this. Nevertheless, this has nothing to do with AfPak and it defies reason that he would want to make the war against terror an issue of debate in the election.
Finally, what does all this mean for India? The tragedy is India's ability to influence anything related to AfPak — whether the realignment of domestic forces within Pakistan or the reshaping of US strategy — is woefully limited. It has made itself a bystander in its neighbourhood, watching from the side-lines and cheering, squealing or lamenting when events happen.
Why could the US kill bin Laden and why can't India even think of a covert operation to neutralise its own terrorists in Pakistan? This is a matter of political will and military capability, true, but more than that it is a reflection of the quantum and quality of either country's strategic assets in Pakistan.
The US has politicians, generals, intelligence operatives, even ISI insiders it controls and gets information and help from. It uses them and promotes them at the expense of their peers who, on the other hand, don't like America. This makes America a stakeholder in Pakistan, gives it an ability to help determine decisions in Islamabad-Rawalpindi. In an extraordinary situation, it gives it vital inputs to execute a bin Laden style mission.
India has cultivated and sponsored no such assets in Pakistan's polity and establishment. That reflects both its unimportance and its impotence. It is the Great Game's great spectator.